A Leicestershire police constable has been dismissed without notice following a gross misconduct hearing. The officer, PC Rachael Hughes, was found to have breached standards of professional behavior by sharing confidential information and encouraging a member of the public to be dishonest.
The misconduct hearing revealed that between February 2020 and February 2021, PC Hughes had contact with three members of the public. During these interactions, she disclosed sensitive information that she had access to as a police officer. This information was shared without a legitimate policing purpose and in violation of her legal authority.
Additionally, PC Hughes was found to have encouraged a member of the public to lie. Her actions were deemed to be a serious breach of trust and undermined public confidence in the Leicestershire Police force.
Detective Superintendent Alison Tompkins, head of the force’s Professional Standards Department, emphasized the importance of maintaining confidentiality and integrity in policing. She stated, "A police officer is entrusted by the force and the public to be responsible for and to be respectful of confidential and sensitive information. Training is provided to all officers and staff in force in relation to this."
The panel overseeing the misconduct hearing concluded that PC Hughes' actions were a clear violation of the expected standards of professional behavior. As a result, they determined that dismissal without notice was the appropriate course of action.
A Breach of Trust: PC Hughes and the Misuse of Confidential Information
PC Hughes, a Neighborhood Officer in the Hinckley and Blaby area of Leicestershire, found herself in hot water after a series of incidents involving the disclosure of confidential police information.
Between February 2020 and February 2021, PC Hughes sent numerous text messages and emails to members of the public, revealing sensitive details that were not intended for public consumption. These disclosures included:
- Names and addresses of individuals involved in police investigations
- Details of police alarms installed in private homes
- Information about individuals under child protection orders
- Confidential details from police databases
One particularly concerning instance involved PC Hughes asking a member of the public to lie about the source of information they had received. This suggests a deliberate attempt to cover up his actions and avoid consequences.
The misuse of confidential information by police officers is a serious breach of trust and can have far-reaching consequences. It can undermine public confidence in the police and put individuals at risk.
IN THE MATTER OF MISCONDUCT PROCEEDINGS
UNDER THE POLICE (CONDUCT) REGULATIONS 2020
BETWEEN:
THE CHIEF CONSTABLE OF LEICESTERSHIRE POLICE
Appropriate Authority
And
PC 4231 RACHAEL HUGHES
Officer concerned
Hearing Date: 28 - 29 August 2024
Chair’s Report giving reasons and findings
Summary of the case
1. At the misconduct hearing on 28 – 29 August 2024, the panel found that the
factual allegations found proven amounted to misconduct and gross
misconduct. The panel went on to find that for the gross misconduct the only
appropriate and proportionate outcome was dismissal without notice.
References and abbreviations
2. Page numbers mentioned in this report are page numbers of the hearing
bundle unless otherwise stated (such as the 2020 Home Office Guidance, or
the College of Policing outcomes guidance).
3. In this report:
3.1 ‘the 2020 Regulations’ means the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020.
Reference to a regulation is, unless otherwise stated, to a regulation in the
Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020.
3.2 ‘the 2020 Home Office Guidance’ and ‘the Home Office Guidance’ refers to
the Home Office Guidance Conduct, Efficiency and Effectiveness:
Statutory Guidance on professional Standards, performance and Integrity
in Policing (issued under section 87 and 87A of the Police Act 1996)
published on 5 February 2020.
3.3 ‘the college of policing code of ethics’ and ‘the code of ethics’ refers to the
College of Policing Code of Ethics: A Code of Practice for the Principles
and Standards of Professional Behaviour for the Policing Profession of
England and Wales (issued under section 39A of the Police Act 1996)
published in July 2014.
3.4 ‘the College of Policing outcomes guidance’ and ‘the outcomes guidance’
refers to the College of Policing Guidance on outcomes in police
misconduct proceedings (issued under section 87 the Police Act 1996)
published on 17 August 2022 and updated (by having paragraph numbers
added) in March 2023.
4. In this report (or in documents that might be referred to in it) the following
abbreviations/terms are used:
4.1 AA = Appropriate Authority
4.2 HOG = Home Office Guidance
4.3 IO = Investigating Officer
4.4 IPM = Independent Panel Member
4.5 LQC = Legally Qualified Chair
4.6 PC = Police Constable
4.7 PS = Police Sergeant
4.8 PSD = Professional Standards Department
4.9 OCG = Organised Crime Group
4.10 FIB = Force Intelligence Bureau
Status of this report
5. Regulation 43(1) of the 2020 Regulations provides:
43. Notification of outcome
(1) The person conducting or chairing the misconduct proceedings must,
before the end of a period of 5 working days beginning with the first
working day after the completion of the misconduct hearing or
misconduct meeting, submit a report to the appropriate authority or,
where the functions have been delegated under regulation 26(1), to the
originating authority setting out –
(a) The findings of the person or persons conducting the misconduct
proceedings,
(b) The reason for that finding,
(c) Any disciplinary action imposed; whether disciplinary action for
gross misconduct was imposed,
(d) Any direction that the matter shall be dealt with under the reflective
practice review process.
6. This document is the ‘report’ pursuant to regulation 43 (1) of the 2020
Regulations.
Parties, representatives, panel members and other attendees.
7. PC Hughes attended the misconduct hearing. She was not represented. Her
Dad sat next to her during the hearing.
8. The AA is the Chief Constable of Leicestershire Police who was represented
during the proceedings by Mr D. Ring, Solicitor.
9. The LQC was Ms Jennifer Ferrario, the author of this report.
10. The Police Officer panel member at the misconduct hearing was Chief
Superintendent Shane O’Neill.
11. The IPM was Mrs Julia Peters.
12. The investigating officer, PC 1454 Trobe was present.
13. No witnesses attended the hearing.
14. No media representative attended the hearing.
15. There were four observers at the hearing, two were members of the public
observing for educational purposes and two were employees of Leicestershire
Police.
Anonymity and Publicity
16. During a prehearing on 2 July 2024, it was decided by the LQC that reporting
and publishing restrictions would be put in place for those persons named in
the Regulation 30 notice and for certain families or persons named in the
hearing bundle. During the substantive hearing it was agreed between the
parties with the LQC that for ease, there was no need to anonymise any
names during the course of the hearing.
17. The reporting restriction that was imposed included naming anonymised
persons in publishing details of the hearing by Leicestershire Police; reporting
of the case by the media; for any transcript of the hearing; publication of the
outcome and in respect of this LQC report.
18. In accordance with regulation 36(2), the AA published notice of the
misconduct hearing on the Leicestershire Police website.
19. By the beginning of the misconduct hearing the LQC had not received any
written representations from media representatives made in accordance with
regulation 36(5).
20. At the beginning of the misconduct hearing the LQC said that there was no
equivalent in the Police (Conduct) Rules 2020 to the Civil Procedure Rules
rule 5.4C (‘Supply of documents to a non-party from court records’) paragraph
(1)(a) which gives a person who is not party to civil proceedings (for example
a media representative or a member of the public) the right to obtain from
court records a copy of the statements of case, or rule 32.13 (‘Availability of
witness statements for inspection’) paragraph (1) which similarly gives a
public right of inspection to any witness statement confirmed by a witness in a
civil hearing.
21. The LQC also said that the misconduct hearing in this case would be
conducted on the understanding that a reference in the public hearing to a
document or to a page in a document would not automatically lead to that
document or page being made public (so only the words read out aloud from
a document that automatically becomes public).
22. This report was written on a similar understanding that a reference in the
report to a page will not automatically lead to that page being made public.
23. The record of the misconduct hearing is not available to the public.
The Allegations and Response
24. The Officer was interviewed on the 4 & 5 July 2022 and on the 9 August 2022.
25. The Regulation 30 notice was served on PC Hughes on 3 May 2024.
26. The officer submitted a formal Regulation 31 response on 22 May 2024.
The evidence
27. The panel had been presented with a bundle of evidence from the AA
comprising of 569 pages.
28. The IO report provided background information about the factual allegations.
It said that on 19 April 2021, concerns had been raised about regular contact
between the Officer concerned and a member of the public, Person A.
Specifically, the content of text messages from the Officer concerned to
Person A and the alleged inappropriate sharing of information.
29. One of the messages from the Officer concerned appeared to ask Person A
not to tell ‘the intel’ that the Officer had shared photos and Person A
responded to say that they would not say anything.
30. The IO said that this prompted a wider review of the communications between
the Officer concerned and Person A. The review continued when a new IO
was subsequently appointed and communications between the Officer and
other members of the public were also reviewed. The review disclosed that
the Officer had been communicating with Persons E and F and concerns were
raised about the Officer’s alleged sharing of information during the course of
the communications.
31. Following a conduct assessment, the Officer concerned was formally notified
of the additional allegations (to those raised in relation to Person A) on the 19
April 2022.
32. No witness statements had been provided. Prior to the pre-hearing, neither
party had requested that witness statements be provided and the LQC
proceeded on the basis that no witness evidence would be presented at the
hearing.
33. When Mr Ring opened the AA’s case, he told the panel that the allegations
relating to Persons E and F in isolation were not serious. He said that the
communications with Person A, particularly the message sent to this person
on 18 February 2021 inviting her to lie were cumulatively, serious.
34. The Officer gave evidence during the hearing.
35. At the beginning of her evidence, the LQC took the Officer concerned through
each allegation and sub-allegation in the Regulation 30 notice and the Officer
concerned responded as follows:
1.3.1 & 1.3.2 – Admitted sending the text messages; said that it was part of
her policing role because sharing the information was for a policing purpose
and with lawful authority.
1.4 – Admitted sending the information; said that it was not confidential
information; it had been sent for a policing purpose and with lawful authority.
1.5.1 to 1.5.9 - Admitted sending the messages and photographs; said that at
the time she thought that she had had a policing purpose or lawful authority.
In relation to 1.5.6 & 1.5.7, the Officer concerned said that this was
information that had been shared with her and she had not regarded it as
confidential.
1.6 – Admitted sending the text message; said that she had not intended at
the time to persuade Person A to provide a false account; that it had been
intended as a joke and had been unprofessional; denied dishonesty.
36. The Officer concerned told the panel that when she began to communicate
with informants in January 2021 and it was a role that she had not been
familiar with. She said that she had been told that the FIB would take the
informants from her, but this did not happen. She said that when she began to
communicate with the informants, she made several errors in terms of her
spelling and grammar. She said that she sent the majority of her
communications to the FIB however she did not send them the emails to
Person A with the attached photographs.
37. The panel was told by the Officer concerned that in or around February 2021,
it was suggested to her that she attend some FIB training however when she
went to the training on 26 February 2021, she was unable to get access to the
building. This was after she had sent the messages to Persons E, F and A.
38. In terms of the text messages that the Officer sent to Persons E, F and A, she
told the panel that it had not occurred to her at the time that her
communications had been inappropriate. She said that the majority of her
communications with Person A had been sent to a colleague working in the
FIB. She said that she had known all along, that the FIB would be reviewing
her communications. She said that at the time, it had not occurred to her that
the information obtained from the informants may result in criminal
proceedings because she had been told that there would be no enforcement
due to organised surveillance.
39. During cross examination and questions from the panel, the Officer said that
Person E had been known to her as a site manager for the Council. She
believed that it had been necessary and appropriate to share the information
with him and had understood at the time that a data sharing agreement had
been in place. She said that at no time had she seen an agreement. In
relation to Person F, the Officer said that Person F had provided her with the
information about Person H, and she had confirmed it. She told the panel that
it had been appropriate in the circumstances to share the information. The
Officer said that the FIB would not have been aware of her messages to
Persons E or F.
40. The Officer said that she had begun to speak with Person A on the telephone
after being asked by her Sergeant to begin conversing with her. She then
shortly after, moved to texting Person A and quickly realised that Person A
would be providing a significant amount of information, which she did. She
said that she mostly recorded information provided to her by person A on the
internal intelligence system by using the dropdown facility on her work
Blackberry. She said that some of the messages that she sent to Person A
contained information that Person A had provided to her.
41. In relation to the photographs that she sent to Person A, the Officer accepted
that once sent, she had had no control over Person A’s subsequent actions
with these photographs.
42. When she was asked about the message sent to Person A on the 18 February
2021, the Officer said that she must have been told that Person A was soon to
be registered as a formal informant. This prompted her message to her about
not telling ‘the intel’ that she had sent Person A some photographs. The
Officer said that when she said ‘don’t tell the intel’ that this had been a joke.
She said that her use of the word ‘lols’ demonstrated that it had been a joke.
When the response from Person A ‘I won’t say’ was put to her, and there had
been no suggestion in the Officer’s subsequent messages that she had been
joking, the Officer said that she ‘fully accepted that I should not have
communicated to her in that matter.’ When the LQC asked if she had intended
invite Person A to lie about how she came to be in possession of the
photographs, the Officer said that she had not. She said that she fully
accepted that her ‘joke’ had been inappropriate.
43. The Officer highlighted to the panel that since the misconduct investigation
had restricted her duties, that she had been working in the Adult Safeguarding
Hub which involved her handling sensitive data on a daily basis. She had had
no issues whilst working there and asked the panel to have regard for the fact
that she had been entrusted with sensitive information despite facing the
allegations in the Regulation 30 notice.
44. Following the panel’s questions, the LQC asked the Officer concerned if her
position was unchanged in terms of denying all of the allegations. The LQC
asked this because the Officer had made several references during her
evidence to errors of judgement and having been aware with the benefit of
hindsight that she had acted inappropriately in allowing boundaries to become
blurred. The Officer said that at the time of the conduct, that she had believed
it to have been lawful and appropriate.
Legal Advice
45. The panel received and accepted legal advice from the LQC. It was advised
that the onus of proof is on the AA. The standard of proof to be applied in a
misconduct hearing is set out by regulation 41(16) of the 2020 Regulations, as
follows:
41(16) The person or persons conducting the misconduct proceedings must
not find that the conduct of the officer concerned amounts to misconduct or
gross misconduct unless –
(a) they are satisfied on the balance of probabilities that this is the case, or
(b) the officer admits it is the case.
46. Guidance on the standard of proof is given at paragraphs 9.10 – 9.11 of the
2020 Home Office Guidance. Findings of fact in this case should be made in
accordance with the civil standard of proof: the balance of probabilities.
47. The LQC advised the panel that it should make a finding in respect of each
allegation and sub-allegation in the Regulation 30 notice because the Officer
concerned had maintained that at the time of the conduct, it had been lawful
and/or appropriate. Whilst the Officer had accepted with hindsight that some
of her conduct had been inappropriate, the LQC advised that if the panel were
at all unclear about the Officer’s response to the allegations, it should not rely
on any possible admissions and make findings of fact for itself. The panel was
advised to assess the evidence and attach equal weight to the oral and
documentary evidence.
48. The panel was advised to consider the Officer’s credibility and to take into
account that she was a person of good character. In relation to the allegation
of dishonesty, the panel was referred to the legal test for dishonesty as
provided in Ivey v Genting Casinos [2017]. The panel was also advised to
consider the testimonials to assist with its determination as to whether the
Officer had a propensity to act as alleged.
49. The LQC went on to advise the panel that once it had established the facts on
a balance of probability, it should then apply Regulation 41(15) of the 2020
Regulations. This provides:
41(15)(b) The person or persons conducting the misconduct proceedings
must review the facts of the case and decide whether the conduct of the
officer concerned amounts –
‘In the case of a misconduct hearing, to misconduct, gross misconduct or
neither.’
50. Regulation 2(1) of the 2020 Regulations provides a definition of ‘misconduct’
as a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour that is so serious as
to justify disciplinary action.
51. Regulation 2(1) of the 2020 Regulations also provides a definition of ‘gross
misconduct’ – a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour that is so
serious as to justify dismissal.
52. The Standards of Professional Behaviour are contained in Schedule 2 to the
2020 Regulations (incorporated by regulation 5). The LQC advised the panel
to consider the standards of behaviour in totality, including those alleged to
have been breached by the AA, and to decide for itself which if any standards
had been breached.
53. The LQC advised the panel to have regard to the 2020 Home Office Guidance
and to the Code of Ethics that was in place at the material time when
considering any breach of the Professional Standards.
The Allegations
54. The Particulars of the allegation were contained in the Regulation 30 notice
which is attached to this report.
Panel Decision on the Facts
55. Having considered the evidence very carefully including the Officer’s oral
evidence, the panel determined on a balance of probability that the relevant
factual circumstances had been as follows:
PC Hughes had been a police officer with Leicestershire Police since 2001. She
had worked in a variety of roles but mostly as a neighbourhood beat officer and
manager. She had never worked in an intelligence unit but had dealt with it
throughout her career.
In 2020, PC Hughes was interacting with Persons E & F as part of her normal
duties. They were members of the public reporting on potential anti-social
behaviour. In January 2021, PC Hughes was asked by her then Sgt to deal
directly with Person A, another member of the public that was reporting potential
anti-social behaviour. During 2020 and early 2021, PC Hughes was in regular
contact with these members of the public, particularly Person A who sent her
several text messages each day. All of the text messages, emails and
photographs referred to in the Regulation 30 notice were sent as alleged, by
PC Hughes.
PC Hughes sent some of her communications to Person A to a police officer
colleague in the FIB, she did not send her the emails that she had sent to
Person A with photographs of persons known to the police. The Officer had told
the panel during her evidence that she had sent ‘everything’ to the FIB. During
questions from the panel she changed this and said that she had sent most of
her communications.
On or about 14 February 2021, Sgt Wilson received a telephone call from an
Inspector who raised some concerns about intelligence logs submitted to the
FIB by PC Hughes. Sgt Wilson spoke to PC Hughes about her dealings with
informants. On the 16 February 2021, the same Inspector contacted Sgt Wilson
again and said that logs submitted in the previous two days had given rise to
concern due to their content. Sgt Wilson arranged for PC Hughes to be attached
to the FIB for the day on the 26 February 2021. There was conflicting evidence
about why PC Hughes did not attend the attachment day. The panel did not
make a finding on this and did not place any weight on the fact that she did not
attend.
In April 2021, concerns regarding PC Hughes’s communications with
informants were referred to the PSD. PC Hughes was served with a Regulation
17 notice in May 2021 and interviewed on the 4 and 5 July 2022. Following
subsequent enquiries, PC Hughes was served with a second Regulation 17
notice in April 2022 and was interviewed again on 9 August 2022. The Officer
had a Solicitor present during the interviews.
PC Hughes was served with a Regulation 30 Notice on 3 May 2024 and
responded by way of a Regulation 31 notice on 22 May 2024.
56. When assessing PC Hughes’s credibility, the panel had regard for the fact that
she had not had the benefit of legal representation during the misconduct
hearing or during the lead up to it. The panel considered the Officer’s lengthy
interviews, her Regulation 31 response, and the oral evidence that she had
provided during the hearing. It determined that the Officer’s responses during
her interviews, formal response and oral evidence had been inconsistent in
part. It bore in mind that she had not had legal representation however, she had
had a Solicitor present during her interviews.
57. In terms of the alleged dishonesty, during her interview on 5 July 2022, when a
Solicitor had been present, the Officer did not say anything about the message
to Person A on 18 February 2021 having been a joke. She said that she had
thought that she might get into trouble (as stated in the message to Person A)
because she had been concerned that she had not been communicating
properly with the informants ‘right from the day dot’ (page 369). In the interview
the Officer said that whilst she felt that overall she had ‘done a good job’ in
terms of her intelligence recording, ‘how I’d put it all together was wrong.’ The
Officer went on to say that her intention with the message to Person A had been
to convey ‘Don’t bring it up unless they mention it.’ The panel determined that
this was entirely different to the explanation provided by the Officer during the
hearing when she said that the message had been intended as a joke.
58. The panel further determined that the Officer had provided conflicting evidence
during her lengthy interviews and her oral evidence in terms of whether she had
genuinely believed at the time, that she had been conducting herself
appropriately. On the one hand, she said during her interview and oral evidence
that she had been unfamiliar with communicating with informants and on the
other hand, she said consistently that she had thought that she had been doing
a good job.
59. The panel having considered the Officer’s evidence found on balance, that she
had yielded some very favourable results whilst communicating with persons
E, F and A. The panel also found however that in terms of Person A, it had only
been a matter of weeks from the time the Officer began communicating with
Person A, until a colleague raised concerns about the content of some of her
communications. Despite having been spoken to by her Sgt, there were further
concerns raised only two days later.
60. In terms of whether there had been a policing purpose or lawful authority for
disclosing the information, the panel determined that the Officer had been
unclear in her explanations. The panel was surprised to hear from the Officer
that she had not been concerned at the time about sharing police information
as freely as she had. It considered her claim that some information that she had
shared had been sent to her and had therefore not been confidential. The panel
on balance, rejected this claim because regardless of how the Officer came
across the information, once it was information held by the police, it should have
been shared in line with the Force’s Information Management policy.
Specifically, with confidentiality in mind and for a specific policing purpose. The
panel determined that even if information shared by Person A had been
accurate, by confirming that it was information held by the police, this was
sharing confidential information when there was no need to do so. The panel
found on balance that PC Hughes had demonstrated a lack of understanding
for the cautious approach required in sharing information with members of the
public or informants. The panel was surprised about this having regard to the
Officer’s significant career experience, and the training entitled ‘Managing
Information’ that she had undertaken including in March 2020.
61. The panel went on to consider each allegation in turn:
1.3.1: The panel having found that the Officer had sent the text message
(admitted by the Officer) went on to consider the factual circumstances. Person
E was a site manager for a private landowner. He had given the Officer a key
for the site because of significant anti-social behaviour occurring on the site and
the Officer concerned had been very active in assisting him. The text messages
about Family A were in relation to Person E enquiring with the officer why police
had attended an adjacent site rather than the site that he had been working for.
The Officer said during her evidence that she had been explaining to Person E
why the police had attended the other site. The panel determined that the
information about the police alarm had been confidential information. It would
have been part of a process involving the police and disclosing this information
could have compromised the other site’s circumstances. There was no lawful
or policing reason to tell Person E about the alarm because there was no need
for Person E to know about it. The Officer could have used an alternative means
to placate or reassure Person E without divulging this confidential information.
The panel on balance found this allegation proven.
1.3.2: The panel having found that the Officer had sent the text message
(admitted by the Officer) went on to consider the factual circumstances. The
Officer sent the text message because the male had been regarded as
dangerous. The Officer said that Person E had told her about the prisoner’s
release and she had checked the information. The panel accepted this
evidence from the Officer. The panel determined that to confirm the release of
the male to Person E had involved sharing confidential information, because
even though Person E had informed the Officer about it, once she had seen the
information confirmed on the police system, the Officer should have recognised
that it had been confidential information. She went on to share unfiltered
information with a member of the public. The panel found that having seen the
information on the police system, the Officer should have approached her
supervisor and discussed it with them to agree an appropriate measured
response. The panel determined that whilst there may have been a need to
inform the relevant persons about the male’s release, the Officer, in her
approach had disclosed confidential information without lawful authority.
The panel on balance found this allegation proven.
1.4: The panel having found that the Officer had sent the text message
(admitted by the Officer) went on to consider the factual circumstances. The
panel considered that this was another example of information that had been
shared with the Officer, by a member of the public, and having seen the
information on the police system, the Officer went back to the informant and
confirmed the information. The panel recognised that the communication with
Person F in relation to this matter resulted in a very favourable outcome
however, it had involved the disclosure of confidential information. The panel
determined that the appropriate and lawful response from the Officer should
have been to thank Person F for the information and acted on it. There had
been no need to relay the confirmed information back to Person E. The panel
found that that the Officer had disclosed confidential information with no policing
purpose and without lawful authority.
The panel on balance found allegation this proven.
1.5.1: The panel having found that the Officer had sent the text message
(admitted by the Officer) went on to consider the factual circumstances. The
panel reminded itself that when the Officer began to communicate with Person
A in January 2021, Person A had communicated several messages each day.
In one of her early conversations, Person A provided details of vehicles visiting
a particular address. Person A sent a vehicle registration number and the
Officer replied with the name of the registered owner (which had been redacted
in the bundle) and she confirms that it had been a ‘local lad’ on the police
system. The Officer said during her evidence that at the time of sending the
message she ‘believed’ that she had had a policing purpose however having
reflected, she had accepted that ‘there had been errors in oversharing.’
The panel determined that there had been no policing purpose for sharing this
confidential information. It considered that having received the vehicle
registration number from Person A, the Officer should have responded by
thanking Person A and could have told her whether or not the vehicle had been
of interest to the police. There had been no reason to disclose this information
and the panel found therefore that as there had been no policing purpose, there
had also been no lawful authority to disclose the confidential information.
Having reminded itself of the evidence, including from the Officer concerned,
the panel formed the view that there had been a general oversharing of
information by the Officer to Person A. It found on balance, that there had been
a blurring of boundaries in terms of information that had been necessary to
disclose to Person A by the Officer. The Officer herself, had accepted during
her interviews, her Regulation 31 response and during the hearing that she had
overshared information because sometimes it had been unclear to her, exactly
which information was being exchanged by whom due to the amount of
communication particularly from Person A. The Officer had described having to
play catch up most days to try and keep up with the messages that had been
sent to her.
The panel on balance found this allegation proven.
1.5.2: The panel having found that the Officer had sent the email and
photograph (admitted by the Officer) went on to consider the factual
circumstances. The Officer was gathering intelligence about visitors to an
address and she sent a police held image to Person A of an individual with his
name, asking Person A if they recognised him. The Officer said during her
evidence that this was for a policing purpose or with lawful authority. The Officer
confirmed that as she had been unable to send the image using her police email
address because it did not provide that facility, that she had had to send it to
her own private email address and then forward the photograph to Person A.
The panel determined that it had been wholly inappropriate to send the image
with a name to Person A because it had been confidential information; there
was no control over how Person A may have used that photograph and there
had been no policing purpose in sharing the name of the person in the
photograph. The appropriate approach would have been to have spoken to a
supervising officer and the likely way forward would have been to have made a
visit to Person A with the photograph. The panel found that whilst there may
have been a policing purpose in disclosing the photograph of the male, there
had been no lawful authority for the Officer to send it by email to Person A.
Cumulatively therefore there had been no policing purpose or lawful authority
to disclose the confidential information.
The panel found this allegation proven.
1.5.3: The panel having found that the Officer had sent the text message
(admitted by the Officer) went on to consider the factual circumstances. Person
A had reported another vehicle that they believed to be suspicious. The Officer
told Person A that she had carried out some checks and seen that the vehicle
registration number had been an unmarked police vehicle. The panel
determined that there had been no reason for the Officer to tell Person A that
the vehicle had been an unmarked police vehicle. The Officer should have
either asked a supervisor for advice or thanked Person A for the information
and informed them that they did not need to concern themselves about that
vehicle. Having found that this had been confidential information that served no
policing purpose in being disclosed, the panel determined that there had been
no lawful authority for the Officer concerned to have disclosed it to Person A.
The panel found this allegation proven.
1.5.4: The panel having found that the Officer had sent the text message
(admitted by the Officer) went on to consider the factual circumstances. This is
another example of Person A having provided details of a vehicle and the
Officer concerned provided information of the male believed to be the registered
owner and their alias. The panel reminded itself of the evidence in the bundle
which demonstrated that the Officer had searched the police systems and
Pronto. The panel determined that this had been confidential information and
the disclosure in the message to Person A had not served any policing purpose.
It had therefore been disclosed without any lawful authority. The panel
considered that the appropriate response from the Officer should have been to
have thanked Person A for the information and said that the vehicle was of
interest to the police.
The panel found this allegation proven.
1.5.5: The panel having found that the Officer had sent the text message
(admitted by the Officer) went on to consider the factual circumstances. The
panel reminded itself of the message. It recognised that the message began in
a very positive and appropriate manner and had related to anti-social behaviour
allegedly taking place at a particular address. It went on to reveal that
surveillance would be carried out; that a warrant would be issued and that
eviction would be pursued. The panel determined on balance that this
information related to police tactics and operational decisions and was therefore
confidential and protected. It went on to determine that there had been no
policing purpose in relaying this information to Person A and it should not have
been shared. Sharing the information had therefore been without lawful
authority.
The panel found this allegation proven.
1.5.6: The panel having found that the Officer had sent the text message
(admitted by the Officer) went on to consider the factual circumstances. This
message related to communications between Person A and the Officer
regarding a family that Person A had been reporting on in terms of anti-social
behaviour. The panel reminded itself of the message and saw that when the
Officer had sent the message to Person A it had appeared to have been
unprompted. The message contained information from the Officer about a
meeting involving social services, and it had provided information about the
children that had arisen as result of that meeting. The Officer had told the panel
during her evidence that Person A had been aware of involvement by social
services with this particular family. The panel determined that this had been
irrelevant because whether or not Person A had been aware, there had been
no policing purpose for the Officer to have disclosed the information that she
had. The information had been confidential and protected due to its sensitive
nature. The panel determined that there had been no need to tell Person A that
she had attended a meeting with social services however if she had said that
she had attended a meeting and stopped there, that may have been
acceptable. In disclosing the section 47 outcome, the Officer had stepped firmly
outside of that boundary for which she had had no lawful authority.
The panel found this allegation proven.
1.5.7: The panel having found that the Officer had sent the text message
(admitted by the Officer) went on to consider the factual circumstances. These
messages (a to c) related to the same family connected to allegation 1.5.6.
During on-going communications with Person A, on the 11 February 2021, the
Officer disclosed to Person A that a social worker would be attending the family
address that day at 10am. Following the planned visit at around midday, the
Officer then provided names of the occupants and relatives and disclosed
autism for one of the occupants. At 12.23pm, the Officer gave Person A an
update that had been provided by Social Services, following the visit earlier that
morning. Included in this update was information about the condition of the
house and a private conversation between the mother of the children and the
social worker. The panel determined that this information (parts a – c) had been
confidential and there had been no policing purpose to disclose any of it to
Person A. It had served no purpose in sharing it. Having found that there had
been no policing purpose, the panel went on to find that there had been no
lawful authority.
The panel found this allegation proven.
1.5.8: The panel having found that the Officer had sent the email and
photograph (admitted by the Officer) went on to consider the factual
circumstances. The Officer had been gathering intelligence about visitors to the
same address as in allegation 1.5.2 and she sent a police held image to Person
A of an individual asking if Person A had recognised him. The Officer said during
her evidence that this had been for a policing purpose or with lawful authority.
The Officer confirmed that as she had been unable to send the image using her
police email address because it did not provide that facility, that she had had to
send it to her own private email address and then forward the photograph to
Person A.
The panel determined that it had been wholly inappropriate to send the image
to Person A because it had been confidential information. It noted that there
had been no control over how Person A may have used that photograph. The
appropriate approach would have been to have spoken to a supervising officer
and the likely way forward would have been to have made a visit to Person A
with the photograph. The panel found that whilst there may have been a policing
purpose in disclosing the photograph of the male, the approach taken by the
Officer had been inappropriate. She had had no lawful authority to send it by
email to Person A.
The panel found this allegation proven.
1.5.9: The panel having found that the Officer had sent the email and
photograph (admitted by the Officer) went on to consider the factual
circumstances. The day after sending the image to Person A as per allegation
1.5.8, the Officer sent Person A another image that had been held on the police
system, by email and asked if Person A had recognised him. The Officer said
during her evidence that this had been for a policing purpose or with lawful
authority. The Officer confirmed that as she had been unable to send the image
using her police email address because it did not provide that facility, that she
had had to send it to her own private email address and then forward the
photograph to Person A.
The panel determined that it had been wholly inappropriate to send the image
to Person A because it had been confidential information. It noted that there
had been no control over how Person A may have used that photograph. The
appropriate approach would have been to have spoken to a supervising officer
and the likely way forward would have been to make a visit to Person A with the
photograph. The panel found that whilst there may have been a policing
purpose in disclosing the photograph of the male, the approach taken by the
Officer had been inappropriate. She had had no lawful authority to send it by
email to Person A.
The panel found this allegation proven.
1.6: The panel having found that the Officer had sent the text message
(admitted by the Officer) went on to consider the factual circumstances. The
panel reminded itself of the text messages with Person A. Specifically that on 4
February 2021, the Officer had told Person A that she would be ‘leaving her
alone’ after two weeks of communication. During her oral evidence the Officer
told the panel that in her mind, she had thought that the FIB would be taking
over the handling of this informant. The panel determined that on balance this
evidence was consistent with her text messages to Person A on 4th and 18th
February 2021.
The panel had regard for the Officer’s oral evidence when she responded to
questions about the content of the message to Person A on the 18 February.
She told the panel that her message had been intended to be a joke. She said
that this had been demonstrated by the use of the word ‘lols’ (twice). It was put
to the Officer that she had invited Person A to lie by omission. The Officer said
in response to this that it had not been her intention to invite Person A to lie
however she accepted that communicating to her in the manner that she had
had been unprofessional. She maintained that it had been a joke and accepted
that she had not told Person A in their on-going communications, that it had
been said in jest.
The panel considered this evidence along with the interviews that had taken
place in 2022 and the Officer’s Regulation 31 response. The panel had regard
for the Officer’s previous good character. As the panel had previously found,
during the interviews there had been no mention of the message having been
a joke. The panel reminded itself that the officer had had the benefit of a
Solicitor during the interviews and ought to have received legal advice. Having
reviewed the Regulation 31 response, the panel considered that there had been
one specific reference to this allegation where the Officer had claimed that the
message had been a joke.
The panel considered that having had the benefit of a Solicitor, it would have
expected the Officer to have made some mention of the message having been
a joke during the interviews in 2022 if that had been a genuinely held belief or
intention.
The panel went on to consider that if the Officer had intended for the message
to have been a joke, when Person A had responded to the message with ‘I won’t
say’ the panel would have expected the Officer to have told Person A that she
had been joking. The panel found on balance that in the absence of such a
response it was more likely than not that the Officer had intended for Person A
to say if asked about the images, that she had come across them via Facebook.
The panel further considered that the Officer had on balance, asked Person A
not to mention that she had received the photographs, because she knew that
sending the photographs to Person A, a few days earlier, had been wrong.
Applying the test of Ivey, the panel determined that having had these facts in
her mind at the relevant time, an ordinary well-informed person would find that
the Officer’s actions had been dishonest.
For these reasons the panel determined on balance, that the Officer had acted
in a dishonest manner and had demonstrated a lack of integrity.
The panel found this allegation proven.
Breach of Professional Standards
62. The panel reminded itself of the factual allegations that it had found proven,
had regard for the 2020 HOG and the Code of Ethics and went on to find that
the following professional standards had been breached:
63. Confidentiality, Orders & Instructions, Honesty & Integrity and Discreditable
Conduct.
64. The panel had had regard for the Code of Ethics and the high expectations that
it places on police officers. Specifically, that a police officer should ‘do nothing,
whether related to work or not, that damages the relationship of trust and
confidence with the public.’
Misconduct or Gross Misconduct
65. The panel had regard to the definitions of ‘misconduct’ and ‘gross misconduct’
as contained in the 2020 HOG. It determined that the level of seriousness for
the following allegations found proven amounted to misconduct:
1.3.1
1.3.2
1.4
1.5.1
1.5.3
1.5.4
1.5.5
66. The panel determined that the following allegations had been more serious
having regard to the fact that images and names of persons known to the
police had been disclosed; sensitive and protected information relating to
family involvement with Social Services had been disclosed; and Person A
had been invited to give a false account. The following proven allegations
were found to have amounted to gross misconduct:
1.5.2
1.5.6
1.5.7
1.5.8
1.5.9
1.6
Principles applicable to considering outcome
67. Regulation 42(1)(a) of the 2020 Regulations provides:
Outcome of misconduct proceedings,
(1) The person conducting or chairing misconduct proceedings may, subject to
the provisions of this regulation –
(a) Impose any disciplinary action mentioned in paragraph (2) or (3) as
appropriate.
68. Regulation 42(14)(a) of the 2020 Regulations provides:
(14) Where the question of disciplinary action is being considered, the person
or persons considering it –
(a) Must have regard to the record of police service of the officer concerned
as shown on the officer’s personal record.
69. Paragraph 3.24 of the outcomes guidance gives a reminder of regulation
42(14).
70. At this stage of the hearing, the panel was provided with a copy of PC
Hughes’s record of police service and the panel had regard to it.
71. In accordance with regulations 42(14)(c)(ii) and (iii) of the 2020 Regulations,
the panel heard further oral submissions from Mr Ring on behalf of the AA at
this stage of the hearing and from PC Hughes. The LQC had explained to PC
Hughes the criteria that the panel would be taking into account in relation to
the outcome.
72. The panel heard and accepted legal advice from the LQC. The LQC advised
the panel to have regard to the Outcome Guidance and the relevant HOG and
to work its way through the relevant criteria.
73. The 2020 Home Office Guidance says at paragraph 11.116:
In determining an appropriate outcome at a misconduct hearing, the panel
must consider and have due regard to ‘Guidance on outcomes in police
misconduct proceedings’ issued by the College of Policing pursuant to section
87 of the Police Act 1996.
74. When considering outcome, the panel took into account the College of
Policing outcomes guidance (the version published on 17 August 2022,
updated in March 2023).
75. At paragraph 4.2, the outcomes guidance cites the case Fuglers LLP v
Solicitors Regulatory Authority [2014] EWHC 179 (Admin) and says:
As Mr Justice Popplewell explained, there are three stages to determining the
appropriate sanction:
Assess the seriousness of the misconduct.
Keep in mind the purpose of imposing sanctions.
Choose the sanction which most appropriately fulfils that purpose for
the seriousness of the conduct in question.
76. The College of Policing outcomes guidance says at paragraph 4.3,
Assess the seriousness of the proven conduct by reference to,
The officer’s culpability for the misconduct.
The harm caused by the misconduct.
The existence of any aggravating factors.
The existence of any mitigating factors.
Assessing seriousness:
77. The panel considered that it had found misconduct and gross misconduct. In
view of the available outcomes to the panel for the gross misconduct, the
panel went on to consider the seriousness of the gross misconduct first.
Culpability
78. The panel considered paragraph 4.9 of the Outcome Guidance and
determined that the actions of the Officer in terms of sending the images; the
disclosure of sensitive information relating to Family A and the message to
Person A on the 18 February 2021 had been deliberate and intentional. The
Officer had said during the hearing that at the relevant time, she had not
considered that she had done anything wrong however she had since
reflected and had appreciated that she had acted outside of the Information
Management Policy.
79. The panel determined that when the Officer sent the images to Person A, she
either knew or should have known that it had been wholly inappropriate. This
was based on her lengthy experience and her training. Equally in relation to
disclosing the sensitive and protected information about Family A and Social
Services, she either knew or should have known that this had been wholly
inappropriate. The panel had regard to the submissions from PC Hughes
during the hearing when she said that she had been told not to attend the
home of Person A and this was why she had sent the images to Person A by
email. The panel accepted this however it determined that there would have
been alternative and appropriate methods available. In relation to the text
message to Person A on the 18 February 2021, the panel determined that this
was the most serious allegation that had been found proven. The Officer had
asked Person A not to mention that she had received photographs from her
because the Officer had known at the time that it had been wrong of her to
send them. The panel found that the officer, in sending this message had
attempted to cover up her actions.
80. The AA’s case was that the dishonesty had amounted to operational
dishonesty. The panel gave this very careful consideration. It considered the
potential impact of the false account that Person A had been invited to make.
The Officer knew at the time that Person A was going to be approached by a
formal handling unit and had encouraged Person A to lie about how she had
come into possession of police images. The panel considered that if Person A
had been involved in a subsequent criminal investigation as a source or a
witness, their evidence could have been compromised because if it transpired
that person A had told a lie, this dishonesty could have impacted on the
evidence chain. The Officer maintained throughout the investigation and the
hearing, that it had not occurred to her at the time of sending the message
that Person A could have become a witness in a criminal investigation. The
panel was puzzled by this because it would have expected the Officer to have
been mindful of the possibility that a proactive police informant could have
become a witness in criminal proceedings. For these reasons the panel
determined that the dishonesty amounted to operational dishonesty.
81. The panel concluded that for the gross misconduct, there had been a high
level of culpability.
Harm
82. The panel went on to find that the type of harm that had been caused in this
case was reputational harm. The panel reminded itself that the Officer had
sent police images, one with a name to Person A and there would have been
no control over Person A’s subsequent use of this information. The panel also
had regard for the text message sent by the Officer to Person A on 18
February 2021 inviting her to give a false account. Person A could have
shared this message with other people.
83. Paragraph 4.66 of the Outcome Guidance: ‘Where an officer commits an act
that would harm public confidence if the circumstances were known to the
public, take this into account. Always take misconduct seriously that
undermines discipline and good order within the police service, even if it does
not result in harm to individual victims.’
Paragraph 4.69: ‘How such behaviour would be or has been perceived by the
public will be relevant whether or not the behaviour was known about at the
time.’
Paragraph 4.74: ‘Where gross misconduct has been found and the behaviour
has caused – or could have caused – serious harm to individuals, the
community and/or public confidence in the police service, dismissal is likely to
follow.’
84. Having had regard to the Outcome Guidance, the panel found that if the
public had been aware of the gross misconduct findings, particularly the
nature of the dishonesty and integrity breach, public confidence would be
seriously damaged. The panel considered the Code of Ethics and in particular
2.1.1 which provided:
‘Every person working for the police service must work honesty and ethically.
The public expect the police to do the right thing in the right way. Basing
decisions and actions on a set of policing principles will help to achieve this.’
85. The panel concluded that the Officer’s actions in sending the images,
disclosing sensitive and protected information and in encouraging a member
of the public to give a false account represented a significant departure from
the high standards expected of police officers. The panel found that significant
harm arose from the Officer’s actions. It determined that the dishonesty and
lack of integrity demonstrated by the Officer had been particularly serious and
found the reputational harm including potential reputational harm to be at a
high level.
Aggravating Factors
86. The College of Policing outcomes guidance at paragraph 4.76 sets out factors
which indicate a higher level of culpability or harm.
87. The panel identified the following aggravating factors,
(a) There was a personal advantage to the Officer in sending the text
message to Person A on the 18 February 2021 because she had wanted
to avoid the risk of getting into trouble for sending images to Person A. The
Officer had attempted to conceal her wrong doing.
(b) There had been repeated behaviour by the Officer of a similar nature in
that she had sent more than one image to Person A.
(c) There had been multiple findings of gross misconduct.
(d) There had been a significant deviation from the force Information
Management Policy. The Officer told the panel that she had not read the
policy prior to the misconduct hearing however the panel had determined
that as an officer with over 20 years’ experience and having received some
training in this area, that she should have been aware of how to
communicate appropriately with members of the public.
Mitigating Factors
88. The College of Policing outcomes guidance at paragraph 4.79 sets out factors
which tend to reduce the seriousness of the misconduct.
89. The panel identified the following as mitigating factors,
(a) The Officer said that she had not been used to dealing with the FIB and
she had felt under significant pressure at the time in respect of her
workload.
(b) The panel recognised that the Officer had produced some very favourable
outcomes for the neighbourhood which had culminated in her receiving an
award in 2021.
(c) The Officer had shown some remorse and said during her submissions on
outcome, that she had fully accepted the findings of the panel.
(d) The panel had regard for the work that the Officer had been involved in
with the Adult Safeguarding Unit since the misconduct investigation. It
gave some but limited weight to the officer’s suggestion that it had been an
unreasonable decision to place her in this unit because the Officer’s
disclosures will have been audited and controlled.
Personal Mitigation
90. Guidance on personal mitigation is provided at section 6 of the Outcomes
Guidance. The panel had regard for the Guidance. It has considered the
several character references provided on behalf of PC Hughes and placed
some weight on the content when considering outcome.
91. The panel noted from the Officer’s antecedents that she had a clean
disciplinary record. It had also had regard for testimonials and awards.
92. The panel reminded itself of paragraph 6.4 of the Outcome Guidance in terms
of the limited weight that should be placed on personal mitigation where there
had been a finding of serious misconduct.
Purpose of imposing sanctions
93. The College of Policing Outcomes guidance says at paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3:
2.2 When determining the appropriate and proportionate outcome to impose,
consider the purpose of police misconduct proceedings.
2.3 The purpose of the police misconduct regime is threefold:
(1) To maintain public confidence in, and the reputation of the police service.
(2) To uphold high standards in policing and to deter misconduct.
(3) To protect the public.
94. The 2020 Home Office Guidance lists these ‘three over-arching purposes for
police disciplinary proceedings’ at paragraph 4.26.
Findings on outcome
95. Regulation 42(3)(b) of the 2020 Regulations sets out the range of sanctions
open to a panel where it has found that the conduct of the officer amounts to
gross misconduct. For PC Hughes, the two options available to the panel
were a final written warning for between two and five years, and dismissal
without notice.
96. In determining the appropriate and proportionate outcome to impose, the
panel considered the purpose of police misconduct proceedings.
97. The panel went on to consider the least severe available outcome first,
namely a final written warning.
98. The panel considered that fundamental to this case is public confidence in
Leicestershire Police and the policing profession. The question for the panel
was whether a final written warning would assist in achieving the overarching
purpose of misconduct proceedings. Specifically, whether it would redress any
loss in public confidence caused by PC Hughes’s conduct.
99. In considering this question, the panel determined that a well-informed
ordinary member of the public would have their confidence in the police
seriously affected by the officer’s actions. The Officer had disclosed police
held photographs which at some point she had known to have been
inappropriate, she had disclosed very sensitive information about a family’s
involvement with Social Services and had invited a member of the public to
give a false account. A police officer is entrusted by the public to be
responsible for and to be respectful of confidential and sensitive information
and the panel determined that the Officer had breached this trust. For these
reasons the panel determined that a final written warning would be insufficient
to reflect the seriousness of the gross misconduct and redress the loss of
public confidence in the policing profession.
100. In view of the panel’s findings, the panel concluded that the only
appropriate and proportionate outcome for the gross misconduct was
dismissal without notice.
101. Having regard to its decision, the panel went on to find that it did not
need to make any separate decisions on outcome in terms of the misconduct
findings.
Police Barred List and report to the College of Policing
102. Leicestershire Police will be required to report the former officer to the
College of Policing under the Police Act 1996, section 88A.
103. This report is written in the expectation that Leicestershire Police will
submit a copy of it to the College of Policing.
104. This report is a convenient place to record what information if any, I as
the LQC consider in accordance with regulation 42(16) of the 2020
Regulations, ought to be included in the AA’s report by virtue of regulation
3(2)(1) of the Police Barred List and Police Advisory List Regulations 2017.
105. In my opinion there is no such information that I consider ought to be
added.
Right of appeal
106. Paragraph 11.158 of the 2020 Home Office Guidance says:
A police officer has the right to appeal against the finding or outcome of a
misconduct hearing to a Police Appeals Tribunal. The Officer must be
informed of their right to appeal when notified out of the outcome (Regulation
43(2) of the Conduct Regulations).
107. Paragraph 9(1) of the Police Appeals Tribunals Rules 2020 provides:
Subject to rule 10, a police officer or former police officer who wishes to
appeal to a tribunal must give notice of the appeal before the end of 10
working days beginning with the first working day after the day on which the
officer is first supplied with a written copy of the relevant decision.
Publicity
108. In accordance with regulation 43(6) of the 2020 Regulations, I am
required and do require the AA to publish this report on the Leicestershire
Police website for not less than 28 days, as soon as is practicable after it
receives the report and has notified the officer concerned.
109. I have written this report so as not to include information that I consider
should not be made public. I therefore have no redactions to propose for the
purposes of publishing this report.
110. If the officer exercises her right to appeal to a Police Appeals Tribunal,
the AA will in due course be required to re-publish this report under regulation
26(11)(b) of the Police Appeals Tribunal Rules 2020.
Ms Jennifer Ferrario, Legally Qualified Chair
Date: 29 August 2024
