Cllr Martin Brookes Oakham Town Council Decision IN THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL CASE NO: LGS/2011/0537 GENERAL REGULATORY CHAMBER (Local Government Standards in England)

 

 

IN THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL CASE NO: LGS/2011/0537

GENERAL REGULATORY CHAMBER

(Local Government Standards in England)

ON APPLICATION FROM:

Ethical Standards Officer (ESO) of Standards for England

Application reference No: SBE-10830, 10831, 10862, 10863, 10864, 10897, 10898, 10899 and 10900 and SFE-000009, 000014, 000023, 000026 and 000027

Dated: 21 December 2010

APPLICANT: Jennifer Rogers, ESO, Standards for England

RESPONDENT: Councillor Martin Brookes

of Oakham Town Council

DATE OF HEARING: 15 August & 30 September 2011

Venue: Birmingham Tribunal Centre and Leicester Law Courts

Date of Decision: 16 November 2011

BEFORE:

Judge: David Laverick

Member: David Ritchie

An additional Member, Peter Norris. Was present on the first day of the hearing but prevented by illness from further attendance.

Attendances:

For the Applicant (ESO): Miss Janet Kentridge of Counsel

The Respondent: represented himself and was not present at the resumed hearing on 30 September 2011.

An interim decision was issued following the hearing on 30 September 2011 after which the Tribunal sought and has since considered submissions as to what if any action should be taken following the interim decision that there had been breaches of the Code of Conduct.

Subject matter: Reference about possible failure to follow the Code of Conduct

Cases Cited:

Sanders v Kingston [2005] EWHC 1145

Livingstone v Adjudication Panel for England [2006] EWHC 2533

Mullaney v The Adjudication Panel for England [2009] EWHC 72 (Admin)

MC v Standards Committee of the London Borough of Richmond [2011] UKHT 232 (AAC)

DECISION OF THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

The Tribunal determined that on some occasions the Respondent acted in breach of the Code of Conduct and that he should be disqualified for a period of two years.

REASONS FOR DECISION

The Scope of the Conduct of Conduct

1. The Code of Conduct provides at paragraph 2:

(1)Subject to sub-paragraphs (2) to (5), you must comply with this Code whenever you:-

1. Conduct the business of your authority (which, in this Code includes the business of the office to which you are elected or appointed); or
2. Act, claim to act, or give the impression of acting, as a representative of your authority

And references to your official capacity are construed accordingly

(2)Subject to sub paragraphs (3) and (4), this Code does not have effect in relation to your conduct other than where it is in your official capacity Sub paragraphs (3) and (4) are not relevant to the circumstances of this case.

2. Miss Kentridge submitted that a wide interpretation should be given as to when a councillor was acting in his official capacity, arguing that a more restrictive interpretation would not be consistent with the principles specified by the Secretary of State in accordance with Section 49(1) of the Local Government Act 2000, in The Relevant Authorities (General Principles) Order 2001 (SI1401).

Paragraph 2 of the Schedule to that Order provides:

“Members should not place themselves in situations where their honesty and integrity may be questioned, should not behave improperly and on all occasions should avoid the appearance of such behaviour”.

Paragraph 3(3) of the General Principles Order provides:

“Only paragraphs (2) and 9 of the Schedule to this Order shall have effect in relation to the activities of a member that are undertaken other than in an official capacity”.

Paragraph 9 of the Schedule to the Principles Order provides:

“Members should uphold the law and on all occasions act in accordance with the trust that the public is entitled to place in them”.

3. Miss Kentridge also submitted that a wide interpretation should be given to the phase “representative of your authority” as used in paragraph 2(1)(b) of the Code. She submitted that the words, “act, claim to act, or give the impression you are acting as a representative of your authority” aim to ensure that when a member of a Council acts other than in a private capacity, when he uses the title councillor, when he uses the Council Crest on his correspondence, when he purports to be discussing the affairs of and matters pertaining to the Council, he “represents, the Council in the sense that he dons the mantle of his office.” She further submitted that:

“In any situation where by holding himself out as a Councillor, the actions of a member of Council can affect the reputation of the Council that Councillor acts as a representative of the Council.”

4. The Tribunal takes a different view. The Tribunal accepts that a councillor may do things which affect the reputation of the Council but it is only if those things are done in his official capacity that any breach of the Code of Conduct can arise. There will be times when a councillor acts as a representative of the Council of which he is a member. But that will usually be where he is asked, by the Council, to undertake that representative role. The Tribunal is not persuaded that the word “representative” should generally be given a wider meaning, and in particular is not persuaded that a wider meaning can be construed in the circumstances of this case.
5. In relation to several of the allegations against the Respondent, Miss Kentridge submitted that even if true (and the Tribunal understood that those on the receiving end of the Respondent’s remarks say they were not true) the remarks and the publication of them were defamatory. In making the reference to the Tribunal the ESO had not sought to determine whether there was truth in the Respondent’s defamatory remarks and on her behalf Miss Kentridge submits that it was not necessary to do so because the publication of defamatory material was itself improper conduct on behalf of the Respondent.
6. The Tribunal had at the outset expressed concern that there was a possible conflict between the application of the Code of Conduct and the Respondent’s right of freedom of expression set out in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Miss Kentridge accepts that the Article is engaged but submits that it is the whole article which is engaged, including paragraph 2 which states:

“The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law, and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary”.

7. Miss Kentridge drew attention to Sanders v Kingston [2005]EWHC 1145 (Admin) where Wilkie J reached the conclusion that the Code met the requirements of Article 10(2) as being prescribed by law and for a legitimate purpose, although he also accepted that there might be cases where the enforcement of the Code against a councillor who expressed political views in could give rise to an infringement of Article 10 rights.
8. Miss Kentridge submitted that when the Code is properly interpreted and applied its enforcement can never give rise to an infringement of Article 10 rights. She sees a distinction between what an ordinary citizen (who may be free to express views as rudely as he or she chooses) can do and what she describes as “an elected official acting under the title of his office.”
9. The Tribunal is very doubtful of adopting that reasoning particularly when account is taken of the higher level of protection which Wilkie J noted applies to the expression of political views. Miss Kentridge herself helpfully drew attention to dicta in the Livingstone case where Collins J stated:

“There can be no doubt that restraints imposed by a code of conduct designed to uphold proper standards of public life are in principle likely to be within Article 10(2). But it is important that the restraints should not extend beyond what is necessary to maintain those standards”.

10. In Mullaney v The Adjudication Panel for England [2009] EWHC 72 (Admin), Charles J approved the dicta in Wilkie and Livingstone that in principle the Code satisfies Article 10(2) but added that the restraints imposed by the Code should not extend beyond what is necessary to maintain proper standards in public life and again commented that political expression attracts a higher level of protection.
11. Bearing in mind that English Law does provide remedies where people claim to have been defamed, and may also provide injunctions to prevent the publication of defamatory material, the Tribunal is doubtful whether it is ­necessary for the Code to be applied for that particular purpose.
12. The Tribunal notes that as shown in some of the cited cases, remarks emanating from politicians should not necessarily be regarded as the expression of political views – they may sometimes be vulgar abuse.
13. Miss Kentridge drew attention to paragraph 1 of the Code of Conduct which enjoins that the Code should be read together with the general principles prescribed by the Secretary of the State.
14. The Tribunal has reminded itself that its task is to determine whether there has been a breach of the relevant Code of Conduct. The Tribunal can envisage circumstances whereby it finds that a councillor who in the words of the General Principles Order has behaved improperly is found not to be in breach of the Code of Conduct because his behaviour, however reprehensible, is not undertaken in his official capacity, as defined in the Code of Conduct.
15. The distinction between what a councillor did in his official capacity and the councillor’s other activities was recognised by the then Secretary of State in issuing the General Principles Order. The Tribunal needs to determine on which side of the line each of the Respondent’s activities fell. Only if in each case the Respondent was acting in his official capacity can the Tribunal go on to consider the propriety of his actions.
16. Miss Kentridge helpfully drew attention to Mullaney where Charles J considered a provision in an earlier Code that it applied where a “Councillor conducts the business of the office to which he is elected.” He said those were: “ordinary descriptive English words. Their application is inevitably fact- sensitive and so whether or not a person is so acting calls for informed judgment by reference to the facts of a given case”.
17. The Tribunal accepts Miss Kentridge’s submission, based on the judgment in Mullaney that important factors would be the reasons why, the circumstances in which and the reasons for which the communication was made.
18. Charles J in Mullaney quoted dicta in Livingstone v Adjudication Panel for England [2006] EWHC 2533 where Collins J said that:

“official capacity will include anything done in dealing with staff, when representing the Council, in dealing with constituency problems and so on”

19. In MC v Standards Committee of the London Borough of Richmond [2011] UKHT 232 (AAC) Judge Ward commented that the dicta in Livingstone were not binding authority to the effect that any time a member deals with staff he is acting in his official capacity. Judge Ward also stated that the fact that the example from Livingstone was cited and applied in Mullaney did not amount to approving the dictum in Livingstone.
20. The Tribunal regards itself as bound by the view of Judge Ward that not all dealings between a councillor and staff result in a finding that the councillor is acting in his official capacity. The Tribunal need not concern itself with Miss Kentridge’s own view that the councillor in the MC case was so acting.
21. Miss Kentridge submitted that any suggestion (that she implies is made by Judge Ward) that misuse of a member’s position as a member is no longer covered by the Code is clearly mistaken. The Tribunal sees her submission as being based on a mistaken approach of equating a member’s office as a councillor with being a representative of the Council. None of the particular actions of the Respondent under consideration by the Tribunal involve his acting or claiming to act as a representative of the Council.
22. Miss Kentridge submitted, that although signing himself as “Councillor” is not itself sufficient to establish that the Respondent’s action is undertaken in an official capacity it is highly indicative of this, although if the particular entry is entirely extraneous to Council business this might offset that initial assumption.
23. The Tribunal takes a more cautious approach. If the particular entry is entirely extraneous to the Council’s business it is hard to see how the writer can be said to be acting in his official capacity. Even where he is writing about the Council he is necessarily acting in his official capacity in so doing. The particular circumstances need to be carefully examined.

Findings as to whether the Code of Conduct has been followed

24. Having dealt with those general submissions from Miss Kentridge the Tribunal has looked at each of the allegations (other than 1 to 3) which had already been dismissed and reached the following conclusions both about whether the actions were those taken in an official capacity and whether they involved a breach of the Code of Conduct.
25. Allegation 4 was about emails which the Respondent sent to another councillor on 10 March 2010. Although he used the title of councillor in “signing” these emails, and copied them to other members of the Council, they were not in fact about Council business – they were about what the Respondent saw as personal attacks upon him in a blog for which he believed, rightly or wrongly, the recipient councillor to be responsible. In the Tribunal’s view, these were not emails sent in the Respondent’s official capacity.
26. Allegation 5 was a blog written by the Respondent containing his account of what had happened at a meeting of the Council and including a statement that the Respondent would call the Police to ask them to remove a particular member of the public should that person attend a future meeting. Whether or not made in an official capacity, the Tribunal simply does not share the ESO’s view that such a comment, constituted a lack of respect toward the person concerned and thus a breach of the Code. It is hard to see it as anything other than an empty threat. The complaint about this matter should not, in the Tribunal’s view have been accepted for investigation.
27. Allegation 6 relates to an email sent by the Respondent to various people about another councillor, Councillor D in sending this email, the Respondent did not style himself Councillor. The Tribunal cannot see how that email can be said to have been sent in his official capacity. It was certainly about the fitness of Councillor D to be a councillor but that does not mean that it was written in an official capacity. Nor is the Tribunal persuaded that a different view should be reached when account is taken of the fact that the Respondent had previously made a complaint to a Standards Committee about Councillor D’s alleged homophobic behaviour.
28. Allegation 7 relates to an entry on a blog dated 14 May which began by setting out a letter from the Assistant Clerk to the Council recording that a former member of the Town Council had apologised for his behaviour at the recent annual meeting of the Council. The letter began “Dear Members” and had clearly been written to the Respondent and others in their capacity as councillors. The Respondent indicted in his blog that he would not accept the apology and accused the former councillor of partaking in “online cowardly bullying.”
29. On 13 May, the day after the Town Council’s Annual Meeting, the Respondent had written his own detailed account of the meeting. The Tribunal sees that as being action undertaken in his official capacity – he was using his blog to communicate, as a councillor, with the electorate in the Parish. The blog of 14 May can be seen as an extension of that process and does of course begin with the publication of a letter he had received in his official capacity. The Tribunal takes the view that these actions of the Respondent do lie within the scope of the Code of Conduct.
30. The Respondent has not resiled from his belief that the particular former member was responsible for what he regards as bullying. He told the Tribunal that his remark had been made in anger. Whether the former councillor has indeed bullied the Respondent is not for the Tribunal to determine. The ESO has accepted that the Respondent had been put under a lot of pressure by comments about him.
31. Bearing in mind that the 14 May entry followed an apology from the former councillor, the Tribunal shares the ESO’s view that the Respondent’s comments were inflammatory and could find no justification for them. The Tribunal considers that there was a lack of respect shown toward the former councillor and that thus the Respondent was in breach of the Code of Conduct.
32. That same former councillor was also concerned with Allegation 9 where along with another former councillor he was accused by the Respondent of being a bully and a thug. This was in the context of a blog entry in which the Respondent published a letter by which the Town Clerk had set out a grievance against his employer, the Town Council, the grievance being based on the Respondent’s conduct toward him. On his blog publication the Respondent interspersed extracts from the grievance with comments of his own including the ‘bully’ and ‘thug’ reference. The Respondent was using his blog to explain his conduct as a councillor and the Tribunal regards such actions as being within the scope of the Code of Conduct. The particular reference appears as a gratuitous side-track to the Respondent’s refutation of the grievance and can by no means be seen as an expression of a political view. It was simply vulgar abuse, again evidencing a lack of respect toward the recipients of that abuse.
33. Allegation 8 refers to criticisms made by the Respondent of the Town Clerk whose competence the Respondent had called into question and of whom the Respondent had made thinly veiled allegations of financial impropriety.
34. It was not for the Tribunal to determine the validity or otherwise of the Respondent’s criticisms but the Tribunal observe that the facts which seem to lie behind allegations that the Council had incurred unnecessary expenditure and had received a lesser number of tenders than expected did not inexorably lead to the conclusion, as asserted by the Respondent, that the Town Clerk was thereby at fault.
35. Although the Respondent could have made these allegations even if he had not been a councillor, the Tribunal had no doubt that he did see himself as acting in an official capacity in making them when writing a letter to the Audit Commission and then publishing that letter on 20 April 2010 as part of his blog. The letter is stated to be from “Councillor Martin Brookes” and begins by referring to his having been elected to the Council to serve the people of Oakham. The letter is signed as “Cllr Martin Brookes” and it is difficult to read the whole content as being written in anything other than the Respondent’s official capacity.
36. The ESO had noted that the issue of whether public money was being properly spent was a matter of genuine public interest and submits that the Respondent’s comments on the matter “attracted the higher level of protection afforded by the Human Rights legislation.” She qualified that by excluding from such protection occasions where the Respondent expressed his criticism in a manner which was rude and offensive. Miss Kentridge, in her submissions, sought to draw a distinction between comments made in what she described as an appropriate forum, and those made in an inappropriate forum such as a public blog.
37. The Tribunal does not share Miss Kentridge’s view – the Right to Freedom of Expression is, in the Tribunal’s view applicable in either forum. But the Tribunal is mindful that Article 10 of the Code of Conduct does allow for restrictions on the right to freedom of expression which are imposed to protect the rights and reputations of others and draws a distinction between political comments on matters of public interest (which should not be subject to interference of expression from the Code of Conduct) and personal attacks upon an officer of the Council.
38. The Tribunal is particularly concerned that while the Town Clerk was absent on sick leave, the Respondent’s blog contained a series of comments about the way the Town Clerk acted and the terms of his engagement by the Council. The entries include specific reference to the failed relationship between the Town Clerk and the Respondent as a councillor, confirming the view that in making these comments the councillor was acting, albeit improperly, in his role as a councillor.
39. By acting in that way, the Respondent did fail to treat the Town Clerk with respect. It is difficult to see how this kind of public spat can do other than bring the Town Council, and the Respondent’s own office as councillor, into disrepute.
40. The Code of Conduct provides that a member must not bully anyone. The Tribunal has noted the description of bullying set out in paragraph 7.49 of the ESO’s report of her investigation. The Tribunal understands that this paragraph or something similar appears in guidance issued by Standards for England. However, bully is defined in the Shorter Oxford dictionary as “to act the bully towards; to intimidate, overawe.” That is a much narrower definition than the guidance used by the ESO. The Tribunal takes the view that if the Secretary of State wishes the Code of Conduct to apply to conduct which falls outside the dictionary definition then he needs to draft the Code in a way which achieves that aim. As presently drafted, the Code does not. There is no evidence that the Town Clerk was overawed or that he was intimidated. Undoubtedly he was criticised and in a more public way than was appropriate. It may well be the case that the criticism was itself unfair and a reflection of the Respondent’s difficulty in taking a more balanced view. However, the Tribunal is also mindful that the Town Clerk was occupying the most senior post in the Council and, notwithstanding the ESO’s observations on this matter at paragraph 7.52 of her report, in the Tribunal’s view the threshold for a bullying relationship to be proven must be a high one. The Tribunal’s conclusion is that the Respondent’s conduct, though disrespectful, fell short of bullying.
41. Allegation 10 also refers to the Respondent’s publication of the Town Clerk’s employment grievance and the Respondent’s commentary upon that letter. The Tribunal has already set out its decision that this improper publication did come within the scope of the Code of Conduct.
42. The Respondent made a reference to it being surprising that a councillor was homophobic considering that the councillor’s own daughter was lesbian. The Respondent was later told that words he used to describe lesbian activity were considered offensive by lesbians and then replaced them on his blog that the daughter “bats first on the LGBT wicket.”
43. The Respondent had no first hand knowledge of the sexuality of the councillor’s daughter. He has said that he was passing on information he had been given from another source. He made no attempt to verify that information or whether, even if true, it was a matter the person concerned was prepared to have discussed publicly. The Respondent has indeed said he did not even know or care whether the councillor had a daughter.
44. The Tribunal has reminded itself that Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life. The Tribunal has already found that in making this publication the Respondent was acting in his official capacity. The Tribunal further finds that in so doing the Respondent failed to respect the human rights of the councillor’s daughter and thus failed to treat her with respect in contravention of the Code of Conduct. There was also a lack of respect for the family life of the councillor concerned.
45. Allegation 11 relates to 8 May 2010 when the Respondent displayed an offensive poster, which he says had been sent to him, on the Town Council’s notice board. He did so at the same time as putting up other official notices. In the course of so doing he caused some damage to the notice board. On 25 May 2010 the Respondent was officially cautioned by the Police for displaying an obscene photograph and for criminal damage.
46. Before the Tribunal, the Respondent accepted that in putting the material onto the notice board he was acting in his official capacity. By putting such material onto the Council’s notice Board the Respondent did bring the Council into disrepute and also by using his office as a councillor for that purpose also brought his office as a councillor into disrepute.
47. Allegation 12 relates to a meeting of the Council’s Staffing Committee on 3 June. Although not a member of the Committee, the Respondent sought to attend the meeting. The Tribunal were told that the Council’s practice was to allow such attendance. As the particular meeting was going to discuss the grievance from the Town Clerk to which earlier reference has been made the Committee voted that not only should the press and public be excluded but also councillors who were not members of the Committee. The Respondent refused to leave, doing so only after Police attended. No further action was taken against him although according to the Respondent’s own blog, he was warned that he would be arrested if he sought to return to the meeting.
48. Although the blog entry contains some personal criticisms of various councillors it can be seen as falling broadly within the boundaries of acceptable expression of views, particularly in the context of local politics.
49. But the Respondent’s actions in defying the Committee’s decision to exclude him (and for that matter any other person who was not a member of the Committee) was wrong. He was there in his official capacity. Defying the Committee in that way, and requiring the attendance of the Police to ensure his removal, brought the reputation of the Town Council into disrepute as well as that of his own office as a councillor.
50. Allegation 13 relates to emails which the Respondent (who is a photographer) sent to various recipients including the local press about another local photographer.
51. The material before the Tribunal included criticisms which that photographer had made about the Respondent’s fitness to be a councillor.
52. Although the emails included the statement “from Councillor Martin Brookes” there was nothing in the content that referred to the actions or responsibilities of either the Council or his office as councillor. The Respondent had previously told the Tribunal that he sometimes used the title councillor to lend greater weight to his communications. Whilst that is not a use the Tribunal would condone, it does not have the effect of bringing the particular action within the scope of the Code of Conduct. In writing these emails the Respondent was not acting in his official capacity and that is the end of the matter so far as the Tribunal is concerned.
53. Allegation 14 relates to alleged disrespect shown to another member of the Town Council. The Respondent made a complaint to the Local Standards Committee about that councillor. That complaint was made over his signature as Councillor Martin Brookes and alleged that the other councillor had called him a paedophile. That complaint had been investigated by an ESO who found that there was not sufficient evidence that the other councillor had acted in the manner alleged. But the ESO also found that the Respondent had a genuine belief (based on what he said he had been told by another person) that she had made such a remark. The Tribunal doubts whether, despite his use of the councillor title, the Respondent was acting in his official capacity in making that complaint but in any event does not see any lack of respect in making an honestly held complaint even if such a complaint is not upheld.
54. On 23 June 2010 the Respondent wrote an email accusing the councillor of being evil. The Tribunal has seen nothing whatsoever to suggest that this email was sent in the Respondent’s official capacity as a councillor. That the subject matter related to another councillor is not of itself sufficient to bring the writing of that document within the scope of the Code of Conduct
55. The Tribunal takes a similar view of a further email sent, on 28 June 2010 by the Respondent to the various councillors and possibly others – the addresses on document before the Tribunal cannot easily be deciphered. The councillor did not use that title in sending the email although it does begin:

“It is Council business most of the nasty vile gossip comes from one old bag on the council.”

56. The Tribunal cannot make much sense of that sentence or its relevance to the rest of the letter which sets out his concern that the other councillor, and people who were not members of the Council, had labelled him as a paedophile. The Tribunal take the view that this email was not written in the Respondent’s official capacity and thus did not come within the Scope of the Code of Conduct.

Action to be taken

57. The Tribunal has noted that since May 2011, the Respondent has again been a member of the Council having been returned unopposed.
58. The Tribunal reminded itself that only six of the fourteen allegations that had been investigated resulted in a finding by the Tribunal that he had failed to follow the provisions of the Code of Conduct.
59. Those failings were mainly about statements made by the Respondent which in the words of the Code showed a lack of respect toward the individuals concerned. Although the Tribunal felt that the treatment of one of the recipients of the Respondent’ s attacks did not amount to bullying, they went a very long way beyond what can be seen as acceptable behaviour from one person to another, regardless of whether the parties held any public office. The Tribunal has already characterised one of the attacks as vicious abuse. It abhors the way the Respondent has vilified the Town Clerk and the way he made remarks, with no attempt to verify the information or to show concern for the individual involved, about a close relative of another of his targets.
60. The Tribunal has already noted that the Respondent has himself been subject to some abuse. But that cannot excuse his own behaviour, particularly where he chooses to make highly offensive comments about those who have not been abusive toward him.
61. In addition to the repeated failures to show respect to others, the Respondent has shown himself unfitted, in other ways, to hold public office. The Tribunal has in mind the significant lack of judgment involved in placing an obscene photograph onto the Town Council’s notice board and his action in refusing to leave a meeting at which he had no right to be present.
62. The Respondent’s actions have had the effect of damaging the reputation of the Council as a whole as well as the Respondent’s own office of Town Councillor. There is no indication that the Respondent has shown any sign of understanding the standards set by the Code of Conduct despite his agreeing to follow the provisions of that Code. The Tribunal can see no alternative to disqualifying him from being a member of the Town Council, and any other local authority. The Tribunal has decided that the period of disqualification should be two years. That period will allow the particular Town Council to move to a more normal way of operating and will also allow the Respondent time to reflect on the standards which are expected of those in Public Life.

Appeal Provisions

63. Section 78A of the Local Government Act provides a Right of Appeal against a decision that a person has failed to comply with the Code of Conduct and also draws attention to the possibility of an appeal on a point of law being made under the provisions of Section 12 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. By whatever route a Person seeks to appeal the starting point is to seek permission from the First-tier Tribunal.

DAVID LAVERICK DAVID RITCHIE

Judge Member

16 November 2011